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Constrained defense budgets and manpower resources have motivated the United 
States Marine Corps and the United States Navy to seek initiatives that maximize the 
efficient use and allocation of these diminishing resources. One such initiative is the 
restructuring of the Marine security presence at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
through the replacement of the 350 man Marine Ground Defense Force with a smaller, 
rotating unit consisting of two platoons from the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team 
(FAST) Company. Ostensibly, FAST would be able to perform the same security 
mission as effectively as the Ground Defense Force with fewer personnel and 
infrastructure requirements, resulting in both financial and manpower savings. This 
thesis performs a full cost analysis of this initiative to determine whether any cost savings 
will be realized. By reviewing and comparing historical cost data and Marine Corps 
budget estimates, the study determined that there are no real financial savings in 
executing the proposal. The Marine Corps and Department of the Navy may, however, 
achieve benefits in better manpower utilization and opportunity cost savings by 
exercising this option. 
v 
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The research will analyze the costs involved in replacing the Marine Ground 
Defense Force at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba with two Marine Fleet 
Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) platoons. The objective is to determine the overall 
cost of replacing the Ground Defense Force with a rotating FAST security force. 
Research will consist of an in-depth analysis of the costs of maintaining the current 
security force structure, followed by the costs of deploying and supporting two FAST 
platoons. Some of the costs to be considered are billeting, messing, transportation, 
training and ammunition, as well any physical security improvements that may be 
included. The research will provide a full cost perspective of the planned replacement 
operation as well as whether the Marine Corps will achieve any cost savings from the 
plan. 
B. DISCUSSION 
The Marine presence at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba has been continuous since 1898 
when during the Spanish American War, a Marine battalion under the command of 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Huntington defeated local Spanish Forces at Cuzco Wells. 
Since then, Marines have been the primary security force for the U.S. Naval Base though 
it was not until 1953 that the current Ground Defense Force was formally established. 
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Increasing in size to a peak of 1850 Marines in I967, the force has steadily declined to its 
present 350 Marine strength. 
The mission of the Ground Defense Force is to provide internal perimeter security 
for the Naval Base. This involves manning the I7.4-mile perimeter around the clock. 
Observation posts along the perimeter are manned by pairs of Marines who share 12-hour 
watches with one Marine awake at all times. Other Marines patrol the area between the 
fence lines in vehicles and on foot. Their job is to look out for any signs of Cubans 
(mainly refugees) attempting to cross the fence into U.S. territory. Though the threat of a 
Cuban invasion has diminished greatly over the years, Cuban soldiers patrol their own 
fence line less than I 000 meters from their Marine counterparts. 
A declining Cuban threat in conjunction with declining defense budget dollars has 
led to several years of downsizing ofnaval personnel at Guantanamo Bay. Since 1994, 
the base population has been cut in half, from 6000 service members, dependents and 
civilian employees to about 3000 today. Throughout these cutbacks, the Marine presence 
has remained relatively constant. 
Following this downsizing trend, recently Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps along 
with Marine Forces Atlantic, have been reviewing options on how to also reduce the 
Marine security presence. The most heavily favored option is to replace the current 350-
man Marine Ground Defense Force with a smaller unit made up of two platoons (90 
Marines) from the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) Companies. The Virginia 
based I st and 2d FAST Companies would exchange security responsibilities as they rotate 
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their respective platoons on and off island every 90 days. The impetus would be that 
FAST would be able to perform the security mission as effectively as the Ground Defense 
Marines with fewer personnel and infrastructure requirements (approximately 20% of the 
Ground Defense Force are support) resulting in a net gain of more than 200 Marines that 
would return to operating forces, as well as creating greater efficiencies through the 
utilization of a smaller, better trained force equipped with the latest security technology. 
In the event of a Cuban military threat, the platoons would be rapidly reinforced by the 2d 
Marine Expeditionary Force from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 
Though a smaller force, the 45 man FAST Platoons are highly trained in 
antiterrorism and force protection tactics. They are armed with a full array of small arms 
and crew served weapons that include heavy machine guns and mortars .. Typically, one 
full12-man squad is trained in Close Quarters Battle (CQB) tactics. Platoons are led by 
Captains from combat arms occupational specialties. Each platoon has one staff non-
commissioned and six to eight non-commissioned officers (Sergeants and Corporals), 
most coming from tours with operating forces. Because of their unique skills and rapid 
deployability, FAST in recent years, has become the force of choice for antiterrorism 
security missions. 
The objective of this project is to identify the costs involved in replacing the 
Marine Ground Defense Force by two FAST platoons and to compare those costs with 
the current cost of maintaining the current security force structure. By providing a full 
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cost perspective of the planned replacement operation, a better understanding can be 
garnered on whether the Marine Corps will achieve any cost savings from the plan. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is the full cost of replacing Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay's Ground 
Defense Force with two Platoons of the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team? 
2. Secondary Questions 
a. What is the annual cost of maintaining the current Marine Ground 
Defense Force? 
b. What will be the cost of returning the Marines of the Ground Defense 
Force to CONUS? 
c. What will be the annual cost oftransporting two FAST platoons to 
and from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba? 
d. What will be the cost of billeting and messing for two FAST platoons? 
e. What will be the cost of both commercial and tactical vehicle support 
for two FAST platoons and how do those costs compare with current vehicle 
costs? 
f. What will be the cost, including ammunition, of sustainment training 
for the two FAST platoons in comparison to current ammunition costs? 
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g. What is the cost of any physical security improvements to support the FAST 
mission? 
h. What will be the opportunity cost of devoting two FAST platoons to 
an on-going security mission? 
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The scope of the thesis will consist of: (1) a comprehensive examination of 
FAST's mission of securing Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay (2) the equipment and 
personnel requirements for carrying out the mission and their resulting costs and (3) the 
cost of maintaining the current Marine Ground Defense Force. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used will incorporate the following steps: 
1. Conduct a review of historical costs of maintaining the Marine Ground 
Defense Force. 
2. Obtain costs of returning Marines of the Ground Defense Force to CONUS. 
3. Identify all personnel and equipment requirements to support the FAST 
security mission and their associated costs. 
4. Obtain billeting and messing costs to support the FAST mission. 
5. Identify training costs to include the cost of ammunition. 
6. Obtain the cost oftransporting two FAST platoons to and from Guantanamo 
Bay. 
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7. Compile all costs identified to develop a full cost perspective of the FAST 
security mission. 
8. Compare the cost of maintaining the Ground Defense Force with the cost of 
conducting a FAST security mission to identify any cost savings. 
9. Conduct a thorough review of the current employment ofF AST to identify the 
opportunity cost of devoting two FAST platoons to an on-going security 
mission. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I: Introduction, Background 
Chapter II: Overview of the Security Requirements 
Chapter III: Cost Presentation 
Chapter IV: Cost Comparisons 
Chapter V: Conclusions, Recommendations 
G. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY 
By providing a full cost perspective of supporting the FAST security mission at 
Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, proper funding levels can be established to sustain future 
operations. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
A. THE MISSION 
The mission of the Marine Ground Defense Force is to provide such security as 
approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in coordination with the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps and perform such additional functions as directed by the Commandant of 
the Marine Corps. (Ref. 1) The proposed replacement of the current Marine Ground 
Defense Force by a subordinate company of the Marine Corps Security Force Battalion 
made up of rotating Fleet Antiterrorism Security T earn platoons is grounded in the intent 
that the security mission will be carried out unchanged, despite the consequent reduction 
in personnel. As stated by the Commander of Marine Forces Atlantic, Lieutenant 
General Peter Pace, "A capable, ready, and reliable security support capability will be 
continuously maintained, available, and responsive to the security support mission 
tasking from COMNAVSTA, Guantanamo Bay." (Ref. 2) 
B. CURRENT SECURITY FUNCTIONS OF THE GROUND DEFENSE FORCE 
In order to execute its mission, the Marine Ground Defense force conducts or is 
prepared to conduct the following four primary security functions: 
1. Conduct a continuous reconnaissance screen of the Naval Base perimeter in order to 
deter and or detect penetrations by Cuban military forces. 
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2. Be prepared to conduct a ground defense of the navy base until relieved, to include 
the support ofNon-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). 
3. Be prepared to conduct external security support for migrant operations. 
4. Be prepared to conduct external security support for humanitarian operations. (Ref. 1) 
The 350 Marines of the Ground Defense Force carry out these functions through 
the use of observation posts, strong points and reactionary forces. Ten observation posts 
(five on the leeward side of the base and five on the windward side) cover a 17.5-mile 
perimeter. Two Marines man each post (one alert at all times) 24 hours a day. Numerous 
strong points consisting of hardened concrete bunkers have been established on both the 
leeward and windward sides. If needed, these strong points would be occupied based on 
the nature of the attack. They also provide the capability to quickly establish security 
positions to support migrant camp and NEO operations. However, many of these 
positions are badly in need of repair and will continue to deteriorate without a concerted 
maintenance effort. The leeward and windward sides each have a squad sized ( 12 
Marines) reactionary force on constant 24 hour alert, ready to respond to any breaches in 
security. 
C. PROPOSED FAST COURSE OF ACTION 
The concept of operations for the replacement of the Marine Ground Defense 
Force by a rotating Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team platoon must satisfy the Marine 
Corps' intent to execute the current security support mission unchanged. It fulfills this 
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intent, not by changing the mission, but rather by modifying the way the existing security 
functions are performed. These modifications allow for the execution of the security 
mission with fewer personnel. According to the Marine Corps, the modifications will 
allow for a more efficient (through the reduction in personnel), if not more effective 
execution of the current mission (Ref. 1 ). Regardless, the security support mission will 
still be carried out. 
The proposed FAST security functions are: 
1. Maintain an overt security presence along the perimeter to detect and or deter 
infiltration by Cuban military forces or personnel seeking asylum. 
2. Conduct random antiterrorism security measures to deter attack against critical assets 
by Cuban unconventional forces or terrorists. 
3. Be prepared to establish security for two migrant camps, each camp to hold up to 150 
personnel, until relieved by a Joint Task Force. 
4. Be prepared to support the evacuation of U.S. personnel under a permissive 
environment. (Ref. 1) 
The FAST platoon would perform its functions in a manner similar to the way the 
Ground Defense Force performs its security functions. Observation posts and a 
reactionary force would still be maintained, but with a few modifications. Instead of ten 
observation posts, one squad would randomly occupy three to five posts 24 hours a day. 
The platoon would still maintain a squad sized reactionary force. However, the 
reactionary force would have the additional responsibility of conducting random 
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antiterrorism measures in the form of offensive, defensive and patrolling exercises along 
the naval station perimeter. (Ref. I) 
Under normal circumstances, the platoon's remaining squad would be in an off-
duty status. But, if the need arises, the off-duty squad would be activated to perform the 
migrant camp or NEO security functions. The platoon would be able to perform these 
functions for no more than ten days, upon which a joint task force would have to provide 
relief. Furthermore, FAST deployments would be scheduled so that platoon rotations 
would overlap in a manner where two FAST platoons would be deployed to Guantanamo 
Bay 50 percent of the time. The second platoon would reinforce the deterrence and 
detection efforts of the other platoon, as well as any migrant camp or NEO security 
operation. (Ref. I) 
To enhance the ability of the FAST platoon to deter and detect, and/ or respond to 
an infiltration, physical security improvements have been recommended. A key 
recommendation is to illuminate the perimeter fence and to alarm it with sensors and/or 
cameras. Doing this would have the most significant impact on overall security, but 
would also offer the biggest cost, which is estimated at I.8 million dollars. (Ref. I) 
D. RESOURCES REQUIRED 
In order to support the replacement operation, the Marine Corps must increase the 
size ofFAST's parent unit, the Marine Corps Security Battalion. The increase would 
come in the form of three additional FAST platoons, additional Battalion support 
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personnel and a permanent headquarters element in Guantanamo Bay to provide 
oversight and administrative support for the rotating platoons. The Marines from the 
disestablished Ground Defense Force would provide the additional personnel structure 
that would make these additions possible. (Ref. 1) Even with the personnel increase for 
Marine Security Force Battalion, a significant number of Marines would still be returned 
to the operating forces. 
Table 2.1 shows the grade and military occupational specialties (MOS) for the 
proposed company headquarters element. Table 2.2 details the personnel structure that 
will be transferred to Marine Corps Security Force Battalion to support the Guantanamo 
Bay mission. 
Table 2.1 Proposed Table of Organization for MCSFCo GTMO From Ref. (1) 
Billet GRADE MOS 
Commanding Officer Maj 9910 Officers Enlisted 
Executive Officer Capt 9910 1 
First Sergeant 1stSgt 9999 
Co Gunnery Sergeant GySgt 8152 1 
Supply NCOIC SSgt 3043 1 
Supply Clerk LCpl 3043 1 
Armorer LCpl 2111 1 
Admin Clerk LCpl 0151 1 
Tmg Chief Sgt 8152 2 
Tmg Clerk LCpl 8152 1 
Dispatcher LCpl 3531 1 
1 
TOTAL 2 10 
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Table 2.2 Structure to be transferred to MCSFBn From Ref. (1) 
Billet GRADEMOS Officer Enlisted 
S-4/Logistics Officer Maj 0402 1 
Exercise/Force Depl Off Capt 9910 1 
Radio Operator LCpl 2531 4 
MTChief GySgt 3537 1 
Auto mechanic LCpl 3521 2 
Dispatcher Sgt 3531 1 
Embark Clerk Cpl 0431 1 
Armorer LCpl 2111 2 
Admin Chief MSgt 0193 1 
Personnel Clerk LCpl 0121 2 
Admin Clerk LCpl 0151 2 
Postal Clerk Cpl 0161 1 
TOTAL 2 17 
Create 3 FAST Platoons to support 6 129 
GTMO rotation (2/43) 
The support that the base must provide is consistent with what is typically 
provided other Marine security forces assigned to Navy commands. This support 
includes messing, billeting, vehicles, morale, welfare, recreation and postal services. 
Of these services, only vehicle support is not currently provided to the Ground Defense 
Force. Costs for these services as well as all other relevant costs such as transportation to 
and from Cuba for the rotating platoons will be presented in detail in Chapter 3. 
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III. COST PRESENTATION 
A. SOURCE OF COST DATA AND COST DESCRIPTION 
The data presented in this chapter were obtained from the Naval Station 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Comptroller's office via the Operations and Fiscal Sections of 
Marine Corps Security Force Battalion. The costs presented are operating costs that 
include both the historical costs of maintaining the current Marine Ground Defense 
Force, and the projected future costs of operating the new Marine Corps Security Force 
Company, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which will consist ofthe rotating FAST platoons. In 
addition to the historical and future cost data, a definition of non-operating costs and why 
these were not considered is also included. 
B. HISTORICAL COST TO MAINTAIN THE MARINE GROUND DEFENSE 
FORCE 
The cost to maintain the current ground defense force can be divided into two 
general categories: Marine operations and maintenance costs and naval base support 
costs. Marine operations and maintenance costs involve funding for training, personnel 
administration, and supply and logistics that support security operations. Naval base 
support costs consist of both the funding for the operating and maintenance of base 
facilities such as the barracks, mess hall, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation areas that 
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support the security mission and provide for the Marines' quality of life, and the salaries 
of civilian personnel that operate and/or maintain these facilities. 
Based on a Table of Organization (T/0) of21 officers and 318 enlisted Marines, 
the Operations and Maintenance budget for the Marine Ground Defense Force for Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2000 was $651,000 (Ref. 2). Table 3.1 provides a detailed list of all facilities 
that support the Marine security mission and their associated operating and maintenance 
costs. As of March 1, 2000, 34 civilian employees were associated with Marine Ground 
Defense Force support contracts. 26 of these employees are paid through appropriated 
funds, with salaries totaling $338,063.10. The remaining eight employees have their 
salaries totaling $102,054.08 paid through non-appropriated funds. 
Table 3.1 Base buildings/facilities supporting the Marine Ground Defense Force with 
associated costs From Ref. (3) 
Building Function FY99 FYOO 
# 
M201 Marine Barracks/Command Post $27,973 $27,900 
2130 Communications Center/MARS Station $1,306 $1300 
1679 Quick Mess Hall $40,733 $40,700 
1678 Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (BEQ) $78,886 $78,800 
2122 Armory $2,112 $2,100 
M203 Satellite Fitness Center $7,029 $7,000 
M202 Navy Exchange Mini-mart $1,655 $1,600 
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M211 Morale Welfare Recreation Swimming Pool $103,300 $103,300 
M612 Motor Transport Maintenance $1,768 $1,768 
AV622 Leeward Command Post $17,548 $17,548 
1334 Leeward Motor Transport $939 $939 
1868 Sentry Tower #21 $2,067 $2000 
1911 Sentry Tower #24 $2,217 $2,200 
1912 Sentry Tower #26 $2,067 $2,000 
1915 Sentry Tower #37 $2,217 $2,200 
1918 Sentry Tower #43 $2,067 $2,000 
1919 Sentry Tower #45 $2,067 $2,000 
1920 Sentry Tower #1 $2,817 $2,800 
1922 Sentry Tower #3 $2,217 $2,200 
1925 Sentry Tower #6 $2,067 $2,000 
1927 Sentry Tower #8 $2,217 $2,200 
1932 Sentry Tower #13 $5,267 $5,200 
1936 Sentry Tower # 18 $2,067 $2,000 
1939 Sentry Tower #31 $2,217 $2,200 
2314 Sentry Tower #34 $2,067 $2,000 
2313 Sentry Tower #20 $2,067 $2,067 
M129 Racquetball Court $950 $950 
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M207 Winward Command Post $25,000 $25,000 
M217 Moral Welfare Recreation Club "Post 46" $16,522 $16,500 
M218 Outback Staff Non-commissioned Officer (SNCO) $1,500 $1,500 
Club 
M222 Communications Platoon Building $2,000 $2,000 
M610 Carpentry Shop $5,000 $5,000 
M611 Supply $2,941 $2,941 
M614 Motor Transport Operations: Vehicle Bays $300 $300 
M615 Motor transport Operations: Dispatcher $5,000 $5,000 
1990 Lyceum Outdoor Theater $300 $300 
AV525 Leeward Bachelor Enlisted Quarters $37593 $37,600 
1567 Storage Facility $803 $0 
523 Leeward Swimming Pool NA NA 
1311 Leeward Bowling Alley $1,400 $300 
1314 Leeward Fitness Center $1,000 $0 
1574 Racquetball Court Facility $280 $0 
1533 Racquetball Court Facility $280 $0 
1534 Racquetball Court Facility $280 $0 
1575 Racquetball Court Facility $280 $0 
2022 MWR Club Storage $1,300 $1,300 
Totals $421,683 $416,558 
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C. SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL COSTS 
Combining Marine operations and maintenance costs based on the FY 2000 
Marine Ground Defense Force 0 and M budget of$651,000, with the average (for FY 
1999 and 2000) base operations and maintenance costs of$419,120.50 for facilities that 
support the Marine security mission, as well as salaries amounting to $440,117.18 for 
civilian employees associated with operating these facilities, result in a total of 
$1,510,237.60 to support the current security force structure. 
D. COSTS OF SUPPORTING THE FAST MISSION 
Like the costs to support the current security force structure, the costs to support 
the FAST mission can also be divided into the general categories of Marine operations 
and maintenance costs and naval support costs, which essentially fund the same type of 
activities as before, such as security training and base infrastructure support. The 
difference in these costs lies in the varying monetary amounts that are a consequence of 
the replacement operation. As before, civilian support personnel salaries are also 
considered. Additional cost considerations include transportation costs for the rotating 
platoons, Per Diem and new physical security devices. 
Based on a T/0 of two officers and ten enlisted permanent party Marines that 
make up the company headquarters, and a maximum of four officers and 86 enlisted 
rotating FAST platoon Marines, the estimated 0 and M budget for Marine Corps Security 
Force Company, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for FY 2001 would be $101,500. (Ref. 3) Table 
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3.2 details the naval support costs for operating and maintaining facilities associated with 
supporting the FAST mission. The naval base will also incur an additional estimated 
$132,000 cost for a commercial vehicle support contract (Ref. 3). The annual 
transportation cost for the rotating platoons is estimated to be $447,000, 1 while the Per 
Diem cost is estimated to be $94,500.2 
The major physical security improvement would be to alarm and illuminate the 
base's perimeter fence, which is estimated to cost as much as $1.8 million. Other security 
devices purchased for the mission include six hand-held thermal imagers, six spotlights, 
and eight laser kits, which altogether cost $142,262. Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet 
(CINCLANTFL T) has provided the funding for these devices. CINCLANTFL Twill also 
provide the funding for the perimeter fence improvements once a contract is awarded. 
Total salaries for civilian support personnel amount to $417,211.423. (Ref. 3 and Ref. 4) 
I $680 per Marine for a military round-trip flight+ $130 for excess baggage per Marine x 6 rotations per 
year x 50 Marines= $447,000. (Ref.5) 
2 $3.50 per day per Marine x 90 days x 50 Marines x 6 rotations per year= $94,500 
3 There is a $22,905 reduction in civilian salaries due to the smaller number of facilities and buildings 
associated with supporting the FAST mission in comparison to the Ground Defense Force. 
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Table 3.2 Base facilities/buildings supporting the FAST mission with associated 
estimated costs for FY 20014 From Ref. (3) 
Building Function FY01 
# 
M201 Marine Barracks/Command Post $27,900 
2130 Communications Center/MARS Station $1300 
1679 Quick Mess Hall $40,700 
1678 Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (BEQ) $78,800 
2122 Armory $2,100 
M203 Satellite Fitness Center $7,000 
M202 Navy Exchange Mini-mart $1,600 
M211 Morale Welfare Recreation Swimming Pool $103,300 
M612 Motor Transport Maintenance $1,768 
AV622 Leeward Command Post $17,548 
1334 Leeward Motor Transport $939 
1868 Sentry Tower #21 $2000 
1911 Sentry Tower #24 $2,200 
4 Buildings A V622, M20 I, and M203 require some type of remodeling in order to provide adequate 
services. Requirements and costs associated with these improvements have not yet been determined. Both 
the Moral, Welfare, and Recreation department and the Naval Hospital will make the determination and 
provide funding for improvements to building A V622, which will accommodate a new satellite fitness 
center and a field medical facility. Building 1678, the Winward BEQ requires renovations amounting to 
$3,015,000. This amount is not included in the 0 and M costs. (Ref. 3) 
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1912 Sentry Tower #26 $2,000 
1915 Sentry Tower #37 $2,200 
1918 Sentry Tower #4 3 $2,000.00 
1919 Sentry Tower #45 $2,000.00 
1920 Sentry Tower # 1 $2,800.00 
1922 Sentry Tower #3 $2,200.00 
1925 Sentry Tower #6 $2,000.00 
1927 Sentry Tower #8 $2,200.00 
1932 Sentry Tower #13 $5,200.00 
1936 Sentry Tower # 18 $2,000.00 
1939 Sentry Tower #31 $2,200.00 
2314 Sentry Tower #34 $2,000.00 
2313 Sentry Tower #20 $2,067.00 
TOTALS $317,867.00 
E. SUMMARY OF FAST SUPPORT COSTS 
Combining Marine operations and maintenance costs, based on the FY 2001 
Marine Corps Security Force Company, Guantanamo Bay 0 and M budget of$101,500 
with estimated base operations and maintenance costs of $449,867 for facilities and 
contracts that support the FAST mission, along with $447,000 cost oftransporting the 
rotating platoons, $94,500 for Per Diem, an estimated one time cost of$1,942,262 for 
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perimeter fence improvements and additional security devices, as well as civilian salaries 
amounting to $417,211.42 results in a total of$3,452,340.40 in combined annual and one 
time costs to support the new security force structure. (Ref. 3 and Ref. 4) 
F. NON-OPERATING COSTS 
Non-operating costs are costs not attributed to the direct functioning or operating 
of either the Marine Ground Defense Force mission or the FAST security mission. Such 
costs include the cost ofMOS training for Marines and military payroll. These costs are 
not considered because they involve costs that are paid at the component level and would 
not vary depending upon the structure of the security force unit. In other words, these 
costs would still be incurred regardless of the type of security force unit employed at 
Guantanamo Bay, and therefore have no bearing in this analysis. The following chapter 
will provide a comparison analysis of the operating costs of maintaining the Marine 
Ground Defense Force and the operating costs to maintain the future FAST security 
structure. 
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IV. COST COMPARISON 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter compares and contrasts the operating costs of maintaining the Marine 
Ground Defense Force versus the operating costs of maintaining a FAST security force 
structure. The variances in Marine Operations and Maintenance and Naval Base Support 
costs, as well as reasons for these variances, will be discussed. Other variances in costs, 
such as the additional cost to transport the rotating FAST platoons and the cost of 
physical security upgrades, as well as a summary of all variances, will also be presented 
B. MARINE OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE VARIANCE 
Comparing the annual 0 and M costs of the Marine Ground Defense Force (GDF) 
with the anticipated 0 and M costs for the FAST supported Marine Corps Security Force 
Company shows an annual savings of$549,000 (see Table 4.1 below). The cost savings 
is realized from a reduction in Marine personnel and a lower overall Marine support 
structure (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Additionally, the naval base will now pay for motor 
transport support costs previously born by the Marine GDF 0 and M budget. 
Table 4.1 Annual Marine 0 and M Variance 
Marine GDF 0 and M MCSF Co. 0 and M (Cost )/Savings 
Costs Costs 
$651,000 $101,500 $549,500 
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C. NAVAL BASE SUPPORT COST VARIANCE 
Comparing the naval base support costs for the Marine GDF and the subsequent 
cost for the naval base to support the MCSF Company arrives at an increase in annual 
cost (rather than a savings) of$7,840. (See Table 4.2 below) This cost increase is due to 
an estimated $132,0005 that the base will have to pay for a commercial vehicle contract 
to support the FAST mission. As previously stated, this cost had been paid by the Marine 
GDF 0 and M budget for maintenance, repair and fuel for their mostly tactical vehicles. 
Table 4.2 Annual Naval Base Support Cost Variance 
Naval Base Support Costs for Naval Base Support costs for (Cost )/Savings 
Marine GDF MCSF Company 
$859,237 $867,078 ($7,840) 
D. ADDITIONAL COSTS TO SUPPORT THE MCSF COMPANY 
Table 4.3 shows the additional cost of supporting the MCSF Company. 
Transportation and per diem costs will be Marine Corps funded.6 There is a one-time 
cost of$1,942,2627 to pay for the perimeter fence improvements and physical 
5The $132,000 estimate is base on the historical cost to operate and maintain the tactical and commercial 
vehicles of the Marine GDF. (Ref.3) The costs for the commercial contract may be less than the estimate 
since no tactical vehicles will remain due to the absence of Marine motor transport support personnel. 
6Funding will be provided from the Marine Corps Security Force Battalion 0 and M budget (Ref. 3). 
7Funding will be provided by Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Ref. 5). 
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security devices. Though it is a one-time a non-operating cost, the amount appears 
significant for decision-making purposes. 
Table 4.3 Additional Costs to Support MCSF Company 
Transportation Costs for Rotating Platoons $447,000 
(Annual) 
Per Diem Costs (Annual) $94,500 
Physical Security Improvements/Devices $1 ,94 2,262 
(One-Time) 
TOTAL $2,483,762 
E. SUMMARY OF VARIANCES AND ADDITIONAL COSTS 
Table 4.4 summarizes the variances and additional costs to support the new 
security force structure. The summation results in a total cost increase of $1 ,942, 102 to 
support the FAST mission. 
Table 4.4 Summary ofVariances and Additional Costs 
Variance/ Additional Costs (Cost )/Savings 
Marine GDF 0 and M Costs and MCSF Co. 0 and M $549,500 
Costs 
Naval Base Support Costs for Marine GDF and MCSF Co. ($7,840) 
Transportation Costs for Rotating Platoons ($447,000) 
Per Diem Costs ($94,500) 
Physical Security Improvements/Devices ($1 ,942,262) 
TOTAL ($1,942,102) 
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F. ANNUAL VERSUS ONE-TIME COSTS 
It is important to note that the significant increase in costs to support the new 
FAST security structure is primarily a result ofthe one time cost of physical security 
improvements (mainly perimeter fence improvements) and devices as depicted in Table 
4.5. Table 4.6 shows that the increase in support costs is significantly reduced to $159 
when these costs are separated from annual reoccurring costs. Therefore, from an annual 
budget perspective, the financial costs are essentially equal to support either the GDF or 
the FAST security structure. 
Table 4.5 Annual Support Costs Versus One -Time Support Costs 
Annual Support Costs for One Time Cost for 
MCSF Company MCSF Company 
MCSF Company 0 and M Costs $101,500 Physical Security $1,942,262 
Improvements 
Naval Base Support Costs $867,078 
Transportation Costs for $447,000 
Rotating Platoons 
Per Diem Costs $94,500 
Total Annual Support Costs for $1,510,078 Total One Time Costs $1,942,262 
MCSF Company 
Table 4.6 Comparisons of Annual Support Costs 
Total Annual Support Costs for Marine GDF $1,510,237 
Total Annual Support Costs for MCSF $1,510,078 
Company 
Difference (Cost Savings) $159 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FINANCIAL COST OR SAVINGS 
Based on the cost comparisons from the previous chapter, there are no significant 
financial cost savings from exercising the FAST alternative. Even without the one-time 
cost of physical security improvements that amount to over 1.9 million dollars, only $159 
will be saved based on the cost data estimates. Therefore, if the decision-making 
emphasis were on purely financial savings, there would be little gained from restructuring 
the Marine security presence at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay. But, if the decision-
making process takes into account opportunity costs, restructuring makes more sense. 
B. OPPORTUNITY COST 
The Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual defines opportunity cost as the "benefits 
which might have been realized by one alternative use of resources, but which are lost if 
these resources are used in another option." (Ref. 6) The benefit in this context is the 
most efficient and effective use of Marine Corps personnel assets. The current security 
requirements presented in Chapter 2, which are based on the decreased threat posed by 
Cuban military forces, allow for the use of a security force smaller than the table of 
organization of 21 officers and 318 enlisted Marines that make up the current Marine 
Ground Defense Force. By executing the FAST security option, the Marine Corps would 
achieve a net gain of 12 officers and 266 enlisted Marines (See Table 5.1). More benefit 
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would be gained from reallocation of these manpower resources to areas where they 
could be used more effectively, such as the formation of additional FAST platoons. Ifthe 
Marine Ground Defense Force continues to operate at its current T/0, the opportunity to 
achieve the benefit of efficient allocation of manpower resources would be lost. 
Table 5.1 Personnel Savings From Ref. (4) 
Officers Enlisted 
Table of Organization of Marine GDF 21 318 
Less Table of Organization of MCSF Company 2 14 
Less Personnel Transferred to Marine Corps Security Force Battalion 7 38 
in support ofF AST initiative 
Total Personnel Savings 12 266 
C. COST EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE 
According to the Marine Corps Cost Factors Manual, the cost effective alternative 
is the alternative "that maximizes benefit when cost for each alternative is equal." (Ref. 6) 
Though there are no real financial savings achieved by restructuring Naval Station, 
Guantanamo Bay's Marine security force using rotating FAST platoons. The use ofthese 
platoons in place ofthe Marine Ground Defense Force does provide one cost effective 
alternative to achieving security objectives of the Marine Corps and the Navy at 
Guantanamo Bay. The FAST platoon structure alternative provides significant benefit 
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from manpower savings while the Marine Ground Defense Force alternative results in the 
opportunity cost of lost manpower efficiencies. 
D. OTHERALTERNATIVES 
This thesis has focused on the use of rotating FAST platoons as an alternative to 
the Marine Ground Defense Force. Other, more cost effective alternatives may exist 
(e.g., outsourcing), but were not explored in this study. In light of the decreased security 
threat to Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, other options that could provide even further 
cost savings should be considered for future research. 
E. EPILOGUE 
The Marine Corps fully understands the benefits of the efficient use of manpower 
resources as evidenced by the re-designation of the Marine Corps Ground Defense Force 
as Marine Corps Security Force Company, Guantanamo Bay Cuba, on September 1, 
2000. The force structure gained from the full adoption of the FAST replacement 
proposal will allow the Marine Corps to provide for both a continued security presence in 
Guantanamo Bay, as well as additional security forces in the form of additional FAST 
platoons. In turn, these additional platoons will enhance the Marine Corps' ability to 
combat the ever increasing worldwide threat of terrorist attacks (as shown by the recent 
attack on the U.S.S. Cole), against U.S. military bases and personnel. 
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